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The Thought Uniqueness Hypothesis*
Uli Sauerland
Osaka University and ZAS, Berlin
Abstract A novel principle, the Thought Uniqueness Hypothesis (TUH), unifies
several restrictions on interpretation that work in theoretical semantics has ob-
served, in particular the following: binding and scope economy of Fox (2000), and
constraints on types (Heim 2017; Hirsch 2017). The principle not only derives
these phenomena, but makes additional novel predictions such as a reduction of
superiority and D-linking data and the interaction of i-within-i phenomena with
coordination. Furthermore the principle exhibits close similarities to current work on
exhaustification and efficiency (Meyer 2013) with a potential for further unification.
The statement of the TUH is most natural on a realizational view of grammar,
where conceptual representations are generated by a non-linguistic system, and then
realized by the linguistic system. It therefore argues against the view that surface
word order plays a role in interpretation (Chomsky 1970 and others).
Keywords: concepts, types, coordination, binding, scope, syntax-semantics
This paper attempts to unify several independently proposed principles of gram-
mar and replace them with a single principle: the Thought Uniqueness Hypothesis
(TUH). The TUH is similar to the Efficiency principle of Meyer (2013, 2015), but ap-
plies the level of concepts without reference to the linguistic form. The TUH requires
a different view of grammar and its interaction with the conceptual system than the
current mainstream view: Currently most researchers assume that the surface form
possibly after some scope shifting operation serves as the input to interpretation.1 I
find myself forced to adopt a different view where the interpreted form is directly
generated by the conceptual system, and then realized morphophonologically.2
* I am grateful to Irene Heim, Artemis Alexiadou, Aron Hirsch, Danny Fox, Serge Minor, Marie-
Christine Meyer, Guillermo Del Pinal, and Kazuko Yatsushiro and to audiences at ZAS, at SALT 28
at MIT, the Tokyo Semantics Research Group at Keio University, and a the Universities of Hokkaido,
Osaka, and Mie for their comments. Financial support was received from DFG grant SA 925/11-2
and an Osaka University visiting researcher fellowship.
1 This view has been argued for by Chomsky (1972); Jackendoff (1972); Fox (2000) which we address
in the following. Independently, work in formal semantics has adopted a view defined by strict
adherence to surface word-order (sometimes called ‘direct compositionality’).
2 The ‘single-output model’ of Bobaljik &Wurmbrand (2012) is related, but I don’t view the generation
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To introduce the novel perspective, consider first a simple model of a conceptual
system – deliberately one that’s overly simple for humans: a very bare categorial
grammar. Assume that the conceptual system contains the following typed concepts.
(1) a. John,Mary of type e
b. love of type 〈e,〈e,〈s, t〉〉〉
c. everyone= λS ∀x . S(x) of type 〈〈e, t〉, t〉
d. someone= λS ∃x . S(x) of type 〈〈e, t〉, t〉
e. not= λ p . ¬p of type 〈t, t〉
f. and= λ p λq .p∧q of type 〈t,〈t, t〉〉
The concept labels are mnemonic English words, but these are used only for con-
venience. For logical concepts, I state the meaning, while for non-logical concepts
only the type matters and is all I state. Nonlogical concepts such as love have world
argument. One feature of (1b) that will be relevant in the following is that the world
argument position is innermost. This affects what concept combinations are possible
– specifically, only the four propositions two of which are shown in (2): I assume
here that the only possible combination of two concepts is function application, and
use a flexible Polish notation to denote this that will be convenient later on. Namely,
I take both [x f ] and [ f x] to correspond to f (x) in the standard Euler notation.
(2) a. [Mary [love John]]
b. [Mary [love Mary]]
Because the logical concepts are all purely extensional in (1), they cannot com-
bine with the verb as long as their are no concepts denoting expressions of type s. I
assume that in addition at least the expression @ is contained in the intersection of
types s and e (the possible sentient beings or centered possible worlds):3
(3) @, I ∈ De∩Ds
The introduction of @ allows the application of not and and as in (4), but not of the
quantifiers. The expressions derived are of type t, but since they contain @ can still
be viewed as propositions by the @-convention in (5).
(4) [[not [@ [Mary [love John]]]] [and [@ [John [love Mary]]]]]
as a syntactic process in the same way. The realizational view is shared with Distributed Morphology
of Halle & Marantz (1993), but in other respects my assumptions concerning the structure of grammar
differ.
3 I don’t assume transworld individuals, primarily for convenience of exposition.
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(5) @-Convention: A conceptual representation X of type t represents the propo-
sition φ if for any possible centered world w, φ(w) is true if and only if X
interpreted with @= w is true.
The total set of expressible propositions remains finite with @ added (namely, the
boolean closure of (2)). But since both not and and can apply recursively, the forms
of expressions is infinite for every expressible proposition. This infinite overgen-
eration constitutes a difference to the system without @ where each expressible
proposition could be expressed uniquely. Independently of that, both systems are
clearly insufficient as models of human cognition because they still lack expressive
power.
Now consider one model of cognition that possesses sufficient expressive power:
Lambda calculus (Church 1940) combined with a sufficient array of primitives. I will
focus on lambda calculus since it is familiar to most linguists. There are well-known,
equally expressive alternatives in combinatorial logic Schönfinkel (1924); Curry
(1930), and the choice at this point has complex repercussions for the following.4But
all alternatives also give rise to the same infinite overgeneration, which is my primary
focus in the following.
Adding lambda-operators and variables makes it possible to integrate quantifiers
in complex conceptual representations. One way of making this possible is to use
individual variables in either the inner (object) or outer (subject) argument position
bound from a higher position as shown in (6).
(6) a. [[λy [@ [Mary [love y]]]] everyone]
b. [someone [λx [@ [x [love John]]]]]
As already noted for the propositional calculus system with @, the enriched system
also allows infinitely many distinct representations of each expressible proposition.
For example, I show some other representations equivalent to (6a) in (7): (7a)
represents the world argument by a variable rather than the constant @ and therefore
results in a propositional interpretation without appeal to convention (5). In (7b), the
outer argument of love in addition to the inner one is interpreted via variable binding
which in this case is applied to Mary. In (7c), a complex expression composed
entirely out of λ -operators and bound variables applies to the concept love to change
its argument order.
(7) a. [λw [[λy [w [Mary [love y]]]] everyone]]
b. [Mary [λx [[λy [@ [x [love y]]]] everyone]]]
c. [[Mary [@ [[λV [λw [λx [λy [[[V w] y] x]]]]]] love]] everyone]
4 I suspect that neither of the two is appropriate.
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My broad claim in (8) states that our cognitive system is constrained so as to
not allow multiple equivalent representations. The TUH may have a functional
motivation since if it obtains it makes it easier to verify equivalence: equivalence
can be examined simply by comparing representations.But I put such functional
speculation aside for now, and instead focus on a more precise formulation of the
TUH on the basis of the linguistic evidence available.
(8) Thought Uniqueness Hypothesis (TUH): Our cognitive system restricts us to
have just one representation per thought.
The evidence for the TUH that I am aware of comes exclusively from linguistics.
Much of it has been discussed in terms of constraints on LF-representations within
an interpretive view of grammar as discussed above. In all of this cases, though, I
show below that the constraint can be derived from the TUH and in some cases, I
will furthermore show that the TUH derives additional, correct predictions that don’t
follow from the LF-based view. The TUH thus not only represents a unification
of existing generalizations, but furthermore is corroborated by novel predictions.
The specific linguistic constrains I address in the following are the binding economy
condition of Fox (2000), the scope economy condition also of Fox (2000), and the
inflexible types hypothesis discussed in ongoing work by Heim (2017) and Hirsch
(2017). In addition, the TUH is closely related to the efficiency condition of Meyer
(2013, 2015) and can furthermore be unified with current work on exhaustification
by Chierchia (2013) and many others. The structure of the presentation is as follows:
I first introduce a technical proposal making the broad intuition in (8) precise in
section 1. In section 2, I illustrate the proposal by means of binding economy cases.
In section 3, I address the core established cases of scope economy and then show
that the TUH-account predicts in addition cases of overt scope economy. Section
3 address the core data in favor of the type inflexibility hypothesis. In Section 4, I
examine the potential of unifying the TUH with work on exhaustivization by means
of a super-exhaustivity operator. To conclude in section 5, I return briefly to the
cognitive structure based perspective to show that the TUH perspective overcomes
the arguments of Chomsky (1972) for the LF–perspective.
1 Thought Uniqueness – Concrete Hypothesis
In this section, I formulate a concrete proposal that spells out the intuition of
the TUH (8)– namely the TUCH in (9).5 This formulation is, I hope, consistent
with the empirical data that I present in the remainder of the paper, though of
course, the data underdetermines the details of the proposal. The TUCH specifies
5 TUCH for Thought Uniqueness, Concrete Hypothesis.
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that of all equivalent possible cognitive representations within the search space
specified by (9b) only the best representation is actually available. To specify which
representation is better, the TUCH relies on the notion of dependency complexity
in (10). One notable decisions in the statement of the TUCH are that (9b) requires
semantic equivalence of the two representations only for some variable assignment
rather than all of them. This has some support in the account of i-within-i binding in
section 4 below.
(9) TUCH (version 1.0): A cognitive representation B is banned if a cognitive
representation A exists with:
a. [[A]]g=[[B]]g for some assignment g,
b. A consists only of primitive concepts of B, λ -operators, variables, and
combinations thereof, and
c. A has lower dependency complexity (DC) than B (i.e. DC(A)< DC(B)).
The dependency complexity of a cognitive representation A depends on the distance
between an occurrence of a bound variable and its binder.
(10) Dependency Complexity (DC) Let var(A) be the set of occurrences of bound6
variables in A and len(x) be the number of complex concept units between a
single occurrence x ∈ var(A) and its binder λx within A. Then we define the
dependency complexity of A as:
DC(A)= ∑
x∈var(A)
2len(x)
In (10), a specific choice that I only justify later is the non-linear effect of distance.7
The distance and the contribution to DC for an occurrence of a variable can be easily
determined by counting the number of unpaired brackets between it and its binder as
illustrated in (11).
(11) DC([λx x]) = 1, DC([λx [ x · · · ]]) ≥ 2, DC([λx [ · · · [ x · · · ] · · · ]]) ≥ 4, . . .
Applied to any of the three cognitive structures in (7), the TUCH blocks them
because the dependency complexity of (6a) is lower. The TUCH is similar to the
efficiency condition of Meyer (2013, 2015).8
6 For the account of strict/sloppy ambiguities in the following section, I revise this aspect of dependency
complexity slightly.
7 More specifically, the effect is stated to be exponential but this is only to give a concrete number, and
not determined by the data.
8 Even earlier, (Magri 2009: p. 68) discusses (and ultimately rejects) a version of Grice’s manner
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2 Binding Economy Effects
Another principle very similar to the TUH is binding economy of Fox (2000). Recall
that one central motivation for Fox’s account is an observation of Dahl (1973)
concerning the availability of strict and sloppy readings in (12). Specifically, Dahl
observes that, if the two pronouns he and his in the first conjunct are interpreted
as coreferring with John, the second conjunct can receive the three interpretations
(12a), (12b), and (12c), but the fourth interpretation in (12d) isn’t available.
(12) John said that he likes his mother. Bill does too.
a. . . . and Bill said that John likes John’s mother.
b. . . . and Bill said that Bill likes Bill’s mother.
c. . . . and Bill said that Bill likes John’s mother.
d. ∗. . . and Bill said that John likes Bill’s mother.
We follow Fox’s account in tracing the effect to an economy condition that blocks
binding of his directly by John because the embedded subject he is closer, and both
binding relations have the same interpretation. Before addressing (12), consider
an account of the basic strict/sloppy ambiguity in (13) that is compatible with the
TUH. I assume that representations (13a) and (13b) are both available and have the
same dependency complexity.9 Furthermore a representation where the proper name
John is is interpreted in the argument position as any expression of type e might. I
assume that proper names like John correspond to conceptual representations of the
generalized quantifier type 〈e,〈e, t〉〉. This follows if the CR is the ’John where ’n
represents the property of bearing name n and theGQ denotes the Russelian entry for
the definite determiner, λR.λQ.∃x(∀y(R(y)↔ x= y)∧Q(x)) of type 〈e,〈e, t〉〉.10
(13) John likes his mother. Bill does too.
a. [[theGQ ’John] [λx [[theGQ [hisx mother]] [λy [@ [x [like y]]]]]]]
b. [[theGQ ’John] [λx [[theGQ [hisz mother]] [λy [@ [x [like y]]]]]]]
maxim for some cases of scalar implicature that bears a superficial similarity to the TUH/TUCH. I
believe the reasons for this rejection don’t apply to the TUH/TUCH, but cannot discuss them here in
detail.
9 An appropriate revision to dependency complexity (DC) relative to assignment function g is: The
DC of A is equal to the DC of the binding-maximal for A′ variant of A given g. A′ is a binding-
reduced form of A iff. [[A]]g = [[A′]]g, A′ contains strictly more occurrences of bound variables than A
and A′ and A are identical except for occurrences of variables. A′ is binding-maximal iff it has no
binding-reduced variant.
10 The advantage of adopting Russell’s theGQ is small and theory internal. The choice between the
Russellian and Fregean concepts of the is a more general issue that I cannot exhaustively address
here.
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The dependency complexity of (13a) is 32 as determined by the length of the
binding relations.11 If the current assignment g with g(z) = John, the dependency
complexity of (13b) is also 32 as per footnote 9, and therefore both representations
are ruled in by the TUH. (13a) gives rise to the sloppy reading, while (13b) leads to
the strict interpretation.
For Dahl’s example (12), two relevant representations are shown in (14) and
(15) with the binding relations indicated by lines. Crucially, (15) contains a long
dependency of length 7 for a total dependency complexity of 148, hence the TUCH
blocks (15) as the equivalent (14) has dependency complexity 38.12
(14) [[the ’J] [λx [@ [x [said [hex [λy [y [like [the [hisy mother]]]]]]]]]]]
(15) ∗[[the ’J] [λx [@ [x [said [hex [like [the [hisx mother]]]]]]]]]
In addition to (15), also representations such as (16) need to be considered, where
an intermediate variable x and a new binder λx are inserted. The TUCH rules out
(16) because, at 60, the dependency complexity of (16) is lower than that of (15),
but still higher than (14).
(16) ∗[[the ’J] [λx [@ [x [said [hisx [x [λx [like [the [hex mother]]]]]]]]]]]
Consider the effect of intermediate variables more generally: Assume x occurs
bound in a CR C with l = len(x), but is free within a subterm P at a depth of n.
Then replacing P inC with [x [λx P]] creates two dependencies of lengths l−n+1
and n instead of a single one of length l. If there are further variable with P that
are bound from outside of P, the replacement also adds 2 to the length of each of
these. But if there are no other dependencies this predicts that, in the case of length
3, an intermediate is thus neutral for TUCH whether an intermediate variable is
added to create two dependencies of length 2: both (17a) and (17b) have dependency
complexity 8.
(17) a. [λx [lex-a
P︷ ︸︸ ︷
[lex-b [lex-c x]] ]]
b. [λx [lex-a [x [λx [lex-b [lex-c x]]]]]]
11 The first bound occurrences of x and the one bound occurence of y are three nodes away from their
binders, the second bound occurrence of x is four nodes away from its binder. The length of a binding
relation can be easily determined by the counting the number of unmatched brackets between an
occurrence of a bound variable and its binder.
12 Fox argues the (15) is available when it’s not equivalent to (14) as is predicted by his and present
account.
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For dependencies of length 4 and above insertion of an intermediate variables is
predicted. Evidence for intermediate variables has been given from parasitic gaps
(Nissenbaum 2000), reconstruction (Fox 1999), and cumulation (Sauerland 2001),
corroborating the non-linear effect of dependency length.
3 Scope Economy Effects
In addition to binding economy, also the scope economy phenomena Fox (2000)
discusses can be subsumed under the TUCH. The TUCH in this case, though, makes
additional predictions – it predicts blocking to occur even when the overt word order
differs, while Fox accounts only for cases with identical word order. In this section,
I first present the TUCH accounts of two core examples of Fox’s and then I argue
that superiority phenomena in English question can be derived from the TUCH.
The contrast in (18) is one central case of scope economy (Fox 2000). The first
sentence in (18a) allows only an interpretation with narrow scope of the object while
(18b) is ambiguous.
(18) a. Some boy admires every teacher. Every girl does too. (∃ ∀, *∀ ∃)
b. Some boy admires every teacher. Some girl does too. (∃ ∀, ∀ ∃)
For the TUCH account of (18), consider in (19) two possible conceptual representa-
tions that could give rise to the second sentence in (18a).13 The two representations
are equivalent because both quantifiers are universal. Both representations contain
two dependencies, but they are of lengths 3 and 4 in (19a) and lengths 2 and 5 in
(19b). In both cases, the total lengths is 7, and therefore in this a linear version of
the TUCH would not choose between the two. But the non-linear measure I adopted
predicts that only (19a) should be available.14
(19) a. [[every girl] [λx [[every teacher] [λy [@ [ x [admire y]]]]]]]
b. ∗[[every teacher] [λy [[every girl] [λx [@ [ x [admire y]]]]]]]
If (20a) and (20b) weren’t equivalent, both representations would be available. This
is the case with the first clause in (18a) and both clauses in (18b). But only a structure
parallel to (19a) can license ellipsis, and therefore in (18a) the object wide scope
representation of the first clause is unavailable. Therefore the TUCH predicts the
contrast in (18). Note that the account is similar to Fox’s (2000) in many respects,
but his account appeals to the order in which words are pronounced to justify a
13 I omit here operators involved in ellipsis licensing.
14 Note that inserting an intermediate variables in (i) lowers both dependency complexities, but still a
representation equivalent to (a) remains preferred.
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preference for a representation equivalent to (19a) over one equivalent to (19b),
while the TUCH account only makes reference to structural features.
Consider a second case of Fox’s with different structural features, namely exam-
ple (20) of scope economy with reconstruction. Fox argues that narrow scope of an
American runner below seem is unavailable in (20), where in the second sentence
the subject is a proper name.
(20) An American runner seems to Bill to have won a gold medal. Sergey does,
too. (an American runner seem, *seem an American runner)
Assuming that seem is a primitive concept of type 〈〈s, t〉,〈s, t〉〉, the conceptual
representations in (21) might underlie the second sentence of (20).15 Because
the ’Sergey has type 〈〈e, t〉, t〉, assigning it low scope as in (21b) requires that
the world variable argument position be represented and bound. Therefore (21a)
has dependency complexity 8, while (21b) has 12. As the two representations are
equivalent the subject the ’Sergey, the TUCH blocks (21b). The scope restriction
in (20) then follows from the parallelism requirement of ellipsis.16
(21) a. [[the ’Sergey] [λx [@ [seem [x [to have won]]]]]]
b. ∗[@ [seem [λw [[the ’Sergey] [λx [w [x [to have won]]]]]]]
In this way, the TUCH explains (21) without reference to the overt word order unlike
Fox’s account. The TUCH account is based purely on features of the conceptual
calculus.17 This feature of the TUCH account predicts cases where blocking takes
places between conceptual structures that are pronounced with different overt word
orders. I argue that superiority in English is such a case.18
15 I again omit operators for ellipsis licensing.
16 Note that the TUCH also blocks the representation in (i), where a variable of the quantifier type
〈〈e, t〉, t〉 is introduced predicting so called semantic reconstruction. This type of representation
is blocked even when the subject is not scopally commutative with seem since (21b) has lower
dependency complexity.
(i) ∗[[an American] [λQ [@ [seem [λw [Q [λx [w [x [to have won]]]]]]]]]]
17 Note that in addition to the assumption that Sergey corresponds to a quantificational concept, also the
@-convention is necessary for the account of (20). If pronouns or other expressions could be of type
e, the TUH account predicts a reverse scope effect from (20).
18 Independently, Fox (2012) discusses superiority data in an unpublished handout and proposes a
version of the attract closest condition that is sensitive to interpretation. The TUH account seems
preferable to me since it leads to a more uniform account.
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3.1 Superiority
The TUCH account of scope economy predicts the following difference concerning
word order in multiple questions in English observed by Pesetsky (1987). While in
questions with the numberless interrogative phrases such as who and what only one
word order is acceptable, two word orders are acceptable with which-phrases.
(22) a. Who invited who?
b. ∗Who did who invite?
(23) a. Which girl invited which boy?
b. Which boy did which girl invite?
The TUCH account relies on the observation that (24a) and (24b) exhibit a subtle
difference in interpretation (Dayal 1996). Namely, (23a) presupposes that each
girl invited exactly one boy, while (23b) presupposes that each boy was invited by
exactly one girl. Of the three different scenarios indicated by the tables in (24),
(23a) is only compatible with (24a), while (23b) is only compatible with (24b). The
multiple who question (22a), however, it compatible with all three (24a), (24b), and
(24c).
(24) a. Abe Ben Cid
Ann *
Bea *
Cel *
b. Abe Ben Cid
Ann
Bea * *
Cel *
c. Abe Ben Cid
Ann *
Bea * *
Cel
The general nature of the TUCH account of superiority is probably compatible with
different accounts of question semantics. In particular, the difference in interpretation
between between (23a) and (23b) predicts that two distinct representations should
be possible in this case. What needs to be formally verified though is that when
in these two representations the which-phrases are replaced with who-phrases, the
two representations are equivalent. To present these details I adopt a version of the
higher-order questions approach (Fox 2012; Nicolae 2013; Xiang 2016). I assume
two different operators of type 〈〈〈s, t〉, t〉,〈〈s, t〉〉 account for the presuppositions of
multiple questions. The answerhood operator (25a) is adopted from Dayal (1996)
and also active in single questions and selects the unique maximally informative
element of a set of propositions. The big conjunction in (25b) reduces higher order
sets of propositions to just sets of propositions by conjoining all true propositions.
Finally, identity is understood as propositional identity.
(25) a. Ans= λQλwι p ∈ Q[p(w)∧∀q ∈ Q : ¬q(w)∨ p→ q]
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b.
∧
= λQλw . ι p ∈ D〈s,t〉∀w′[p(w′)↔∀q ∈ Q : ¬q(w)∨q(w′)]
c. = ∈ D〈〈s,t〉,〈s,t〉〉
Furthermore, I assume that who quantifies existentially over quantifiers, while which
phrases quantify of individuals (see Elliott, Nicolae & Sauerland 2018). This predicts
that which-phrases in a single question (Which person left?) presuppose the existence
of exactly one individual, while who-phrases do not presuppose existence since the
quantifier no one can occur as part of the unique most informative answer.
(26) a. who=
[
λ p ∃Q ∈ D〈e,〈e,t〉〉 p(Q)
] ∈ D〈〈〈e,t〉,t〉,t〉
b. which boy, which girl=
[
λ p ∃x∈{singular boys/girls} p(x)]∈D〈〈e,t〉,t〉
The two non-equivalent representations with which-phrases that the multiple ques-
tions approach makes available are shown in (27) and (28).19 (27) is interpreted
with conjunction over the girl who each must have a invited a unique boy, which
corresponds to (23a). (28) yields the other uniqueness condition of (23b). My
assumption is hence that (25) is pronounced as (23a) and (26) as (23b).
(27) [
∧
[λp [wh girl [λx [p [= [Ans [λp [wh boy [λy [p [= [x [invite y]]]]]]]]]]]]]]
(28) [
∧
[λp [wh boy [λy [p [= [Ans [λp [wh girl [λx [p [= [x [invite y]]]]]]]]]]]]]]
To complete the account of superiority, we now need to verify that representations
analogous to (27) and (28) are equivalent with multiple who-phrases. Because
who-phrases bind quantifiers, the representations must be ones where they don’t
bind verbal argument positions directly. Two relevant representations are shown
in (29) and (30). Since who introduces neither a uniqueness nor and existence
presupposition, the two are indeed equivalent and essentially represent row-wise or
column-wise complete descriptions of tables such as those in (24).
(29) [
∧
[λp [who [λX [p [= [Ans [λp [who [λY [p [=
[λw [X [λx [Y [λy [w [x [invite y]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]
(30) ∗[
∧
[λp [who [λY [p [= [Ans [λp [who [λX [p [=
[λw [X [λx [Y [λy [w [x [invite y]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]
19 I leave it open why
∧
and Ans occur in the order shown. If their order was switched, different
predictions arise. Fox (2012) builds the ordering into a type system, but as far as I can see this also
lack independent motivation.
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Furthermore the dependency complexity of (30) is higher than that of (29) since the
other binder λY in (30) is associated with the innermost variable. The TUCH then
predicts that only representation (29) is available. By analogy to (23a), I assume that
(29) is pronounced as (22a), and cannot be pronounced as (22b). In this case, no
conceptual representation exists that would be pronounced as (22b) and therefore
(22b) is perceived to be ungrammatical. Below we see that there are also cases
where only one conceptual representation is blocked for a surface form, but another
remains possible.
In sum, the TUCH provides a principled account of the core cases of superiority
in English. This argues that also structures that are pronounced with different surface
word order can block one another. Specifically, it leads to ungrammaticality of (22b).
I discuss one further case of the TUCH predicting a blocked association between a
conceptual representation and a surface form.20
4 Type Inflexibility
In this section, I consider a further array of phenomena that provide evidence for
the TUH. Heim (2017) and Hirsch (2017) have argued that in a number of cases
the semantic types cannot be flexible in an unconstrained way. In particular, both
address type shifts that can be expressed solely by λ -operators and variables.21 In
particular, I address the two instances of point-wise application of a function, both
shown schematically in (31).
(31) a. unary pointwise application: f ′(g) = λx f (g(x)), derived by f ′ =G( f )
with Gγα,β = [λ
〈α,β 〉
f [λ
〈γ,α〉
x [λ γy [ f [ x y ]]]]]
b. binary pointwise application: J′( f )(g) = λx J( f (x))(g(x)), derived by
J′ = L(J) with Lα = [λ 〈t,〈t,t〉〉J [λ
〈α,t〉
f [λ
〈α,t〉
g [λαx [[J[ f x]][gx]]]]]]
For (31a), Jacobson (1999) introduces the term Geach rule, while (31b) is sometimes
referred to as lifting. Both operations can be defined in λ -calculus as shown by the
definition of G and L (for result type t) above.
Jacobson (1990) effectively argues that (31a) cannot freely apply.22 Specifically
she addresses the proposal to allow raising verbs to belong to the same category as
control verbs. Consider one concrete possibility how free application of G would
20 There are at least two other cases that exhibit some, but as far as I can see, not all the predicted
properties: there and raising in English and quantifier scope in scrambling languages (Bobaljik &
Wurmbrand 2012). I cannot address either in detail at this point.
21 I use the term type shift exclusively for injective functions from all elements of Dα to another domain
Dβ with β 6= α .
22 I follow Heim (2017) in the exposition of Jacobson’s work.
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make allow raising verbs to be like control verbs: Specially, the control verb realizes
the concept try of type 〈〈e,〈s, t〉〉,〈e,〈s, t〉〉〉, while seem has type 〈〈s, t〉,〈s, t〉〉.
Then [Ge〈st,st〉seem] has the same type as try. In the system we developed, the
conceptual representations (32a) for seem with a finite complement, (32b) for seem
with an infinite complement, and (32c) for want are interpretable.
(32) a. [seem [λw [ [the ’John] [λx [w [x left]]]]]]
It seems that John left.
b. (i) ∗[[the ’John] [@ [[G seem] leave]]]
[the ’John[λx [@ [seem [x leave]]]]
John seems to have left.
[the ’John[@ [tried leave]]]
John tried to leave.
But Jacobson (1990) argues that the control representation (32b) should be ruled
out. One of her empirical arguments (Jacobson 1990: p. 439) is that, while try like
most control verbs allows bare complement anaphora as in (33a), seem doesn’t.
(33) a. Mary tried to be friendly, and I think Bill tried too.
b. ∗Mary seems to be friendly, and I think Bill seems too.
The TUCH predictions for (32b) depend on the dependency complexity. Since G is
an abbreviation for the complex of λ -operators and variables in (31a), it has a fixed
dependency complexity, namely 20. This is the dependency complexity of (32bi),
while (32bi)’s is 8. Therefore the TUCH blocks (32bi) and therefore predicts the
ungrammaticality of (33b).
But there are two other possible ways (33b) could be predicted to be possible. An
alternative primitive concept seem2 might exist, which is of type 〈〈e,〈s, t〉〉,〈e,〈s, t〉〉〉.
This could occur in place of [G seem] in (32bi). This in general, I don’t think should
be ruled out: two different cases where such a point-wise lexical variant exists are i)
little as a primitive equal to [G not] of type 〈dt,dt〉 (Heim 2006) and others analyze
as, and ii) the passive morpheme PASS as a primitive equal to [λV [λw [someone
[w V ]]]] of type 〈〈e,st〉,st〉 (Alexiadou, Anagnostopoulou & Schäfer 2015). But in
these two cases, the two related concepts are realized by different morphemes, while
seem and seem2 are homophonous. I suggest that this is not a coincidence, and
propose the following condition.23
(34) Avoid Homophony: The exponents of primitive concepts with different types
cannot be homophonous.
23 From this perspective, threaten and other verbs that seem ambiguous between a control and a raising
concept must involve accidental homophony.
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A second possible change rendering (33b) acceptable is to add Ge〈st,st〉 to the inven-
tory of primitive concepts. Since then the use of G wouldn’t incur any dependency
complexity, representation (32bi) above would be incorrectly predicted to be pre-
ferred by the TUCH. A generalization of the condition in footnote 9 maximizing
occurrences of bound variables cover this case, but I leave the details for future work.
Now consider a second interesting argument to restrict type shifts due to Hirsch
(2017) investigating coordination. I focus on the data point in (35). Hirsch points
out that (35) is problematic for analyses that allow type shift to apply to and without
constraint because, if the two quantifiers a maid and a cook could be combined by a
type shifted and into a single quantifier, then the resulting quantifier should exhibit
a scope ambiguity with the subject in (35). But in fact, (35) allows only wide scope
of the subject.
(35) Some company hired a maid and a cook. (some and, *and some)
For the present account, Hirsch’s argument raises the question how a lifted concept
[L〈et,t〉 and] is blocked with L as defined in (31b), specifically when a maid L and
a cook receives wide scope. At an intuitive level, the analysis I propose is the
following. I assume that the realization principles following Johnson (2009) have the
following consequences: both a conceptual representation CR1 with some--and
scope and a different CR2 with and--some scope could yield the realization (35).
But, I argue that a third CR3 with and--some scope can also be formed that has
lower dependency complexity than CR2. Hence, CR2 is blocked by the TUCH. For
this it plays no role that CR3 cannot be realized as (35), but must be realized as (36).
This leaves CR1 as the only TUCH-compatible conceptual representation that is
realized as (35), and therefore (35) is unambiguous.
(36) Some company hired a maid and some company a cook.
The specific representation are shown below: CR1 in (37), CR2 in (38), and CR3 in
(39).
(37) [λw [[some company] [w [λw [λx [[[λy [w [x [hired y]]]] [a maid]] [and
[[λy [w [x [hired y]]]] [a cook]]]]]]]]]]
(38) ∗[λw [[w [λw [λy [[some company] [λx [w [x [hired y]]]]] [a maid [ [λJ
[λQ1 [λQ2 [ λp [Q1 p] [J [Q2 p]]]]]] and ] [a cook]]]]]
(39) [λw [[some company] [w [λw [λx [[λy [w [x [hired y]]]] [a maid]]]]]] [and
[[some company] [w [λw [λx [[λy [w [x [hired y]]]] [a cook]]]]]]]]]
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One case where the predictions of the TUCH account differ from Hirsch’s
proposal concerns noun phrase internal subjects. Hirsch (2017) proposes that and
must always be of type 〈t, tt〉 and notes that this requires him to generally postulate
noun phrase internal subjects to be able to analyze data such as (40).
(40) The linguist and philosopher is happy.
But to generally require noun phrase internal subjects opens the door to i-within-i
binding in cases such as (41), which is odd if her and the wife are understood to be
coreferent.
(41) #The wife of her childhood sweetheart is happy.
The TUCH-account makes slightly different predictions in this case. Consider first
the two conceptual representations for (41) in (42):24
(42) a. ∗[[the [λx [[wife [the [her-x childhood-sweetheart]]] x]]] is happy]
b. #[[the [wife [the [her-x childhood-sweetheart]]]] is happy]
c. [she-x happy]
Representations (42a) and (42b) are Strawson equivalent assuming an assignment
that maps x to Lucy. Given their Strawson equivalence, the TUCH could be modified
to predict that the less complex (42b) blocks (42a).25 Then furthermore (42c) blocks
(42b) as Marty (2017) argues.
Now consider the two conceptual representations in (43) for (40): with an NP-
internal coordination. In this case, (43a) with the NP-internal subjects has lower
dependency complexity.
(43) a. [[the [λx [linguist x] [and [philosopher x]]]]] is happy]
b. ∗[[the [ linguist [λJ [λn [λm [λx [[J [m x]] [n x]]]]] and] philoso-
pher]]]] is happy]
In this way a suitably modified TUCH could rule out i-within-i cases while account-
ing for Hirsch’s other data. One novel prediction such an account makes is that
i-within-i reference should improve in noun phrases containing also coordination
such as (44), a prediction my informal surveying of English speakers has found to
be empirically supported.
(44) Every wife and colleague of her childhood sweetheart is happy.
24 For ease of exposition, I assume here that the is of type 〈et,e〉.
25 I leave the tension between the role of presuppositions for the TUH in this vs. the case of multiple
questions for future work.
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5 Conclusions
The TUH provides a new unified account of several independently established con-
straints (binding economy, scope economy, and type inflexibility). Briefly consider
two further implications I consider important: a possible unification with current
work relating to exhaustification, in particular Meyer’s (2013; 2015) Efficiency,
and implications for the data that drove Chomsky (1972) and others to adopt a
architecture of grammar where surface word order plays a role in interpretation.
Exhaustification typically is stated as an operator that excludes logically stronger
or at least non-weaker alternatives of a phrase P from the interpretation of P. Two
similarities to the TUH exist though: Katzir (2007) and others have argued that
alternative must not be structurally more complex in a specific sense, and Chierchia
(2013) and others have argued that exhaustification can block a representation if
a logical contradiction arises. In cases blocked by the TUH, also a structurally
simpler alternative is available and, since the alternative is equivalent to the blocked
case, excluding the alternative would predict a contradiction. In other words, super-
exhaustification as defined in (45) may potentially unify the TUH and other cases
exhaustification.
(45) [[s-exh]](C)(p) = p∧∀q ∈C∧DC(q)< DC(p) : (q=>)∨¬q
Super-exhaustification negates not only non-weaker alternatives, but also equivalent
ones and weaker ones as long as they are structurally simpler. Only the trivial case of
> is excluded in (45). Super-exhaustivity thus predicts a stronger condition than the
TUH: a sentence is also blocked if a weaker, non-trivial, and less complex alternative
exists. In the case of scope economy, some support for precisely such a strengthening
has been offered in work on generalized scope economy (Mayr & Spector 2010;
Fleisher 2013).
Finally, consider briefly the scope preferences in (46) which played a major
in role in the so called ‘linguistic wars’. Chomsky (1972) and Jackendoff (1972)
argued that quantifier scope here must depend on surface word order. But with the
types 〈〈e,st〉,st〉 for PASS and tt for not, the representations in (47) have minimal
dependency complexity (modulo intermediate variables).26
(46) a. Many targets weren’t hit.
b. Someone didn’t hit many targets.
(47) a. [[many targets] [λy [not [@ [PASS [hit y]]]]]]
26 I assume that representations like (i) are realized with negation in a different position from (46a).
(i) [not [[many targets] [λy [@ [PASS [hit y]]]]]]
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b. [someone [λx [not [[many targets] [λy [@ [x [hit y]]]]]]]]
This observation in my view offers the promise of returning to an realizational
architecture closer to the standard model of 1960s generative grammar.
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